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Article 3

NATURAL LAW AND THE LAW-MAKING

FUNC-

TION IN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE
The category "natural law," in juxtaposition with the
thought-classification "human law," was created by Greek
philogophical genius and refined by Thomas Aquinas, after
an intermediate Roman transition in the form of jus naturale.
Greek philosophers reasoned by analogy from the cosmic order, with its constantly recurring and universal phenomena
of physical nature, to an idealized social regime actualized by
law. Right and justice were based upon the harmony or fitness involved in the nature of things. These notions were
universally valid. They were not a matter of human will.
The classical Roman jurists maintained the ethical homogeneity of the category but utilized it not only in the sense of
a speculative body of universal ideals and principles arising
from the nature of things, but also as a norm with which to
criticize the positive law, and as the basis of jural development and law-making. This jus. naturale was an objective
pattern unaffected by what individual men might think concerning its existence or content. It was distinguishable from
the jus gentium which was positive law.
Thomas Aquinas subdivided the category jus naturale into
the lex aeterna or the reason of the divine wisdom governing
the whole universe, and the lex naturalisor the law of human
nature which proceeded ultimately from God but immediately from human reason in which it was mirrored. This latter
law governed the actions of men only. Mankind ought to
obey the lex naturalis. The rest of creation was under compulsion to follow the lex aeterna.' Aquinas described these
two sub-categories as lex because he conceived the jus naturale. as the enactment of a personal Supreme Law Giver,
Creator of the Universe. Mankind must not thwart this enactment.
I AQUINAs, SUmiEA THLOGICA, (Dominican trans., 1915), 1, 2, 91-94.
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The notion of natural law in politics, ethics and jurisprudence is inescapable. The wisdom of Greek psychic intuitionalism which had penetrated the divine plan was verified pragmatically later in the laboratory of human relations.
The concept of natural law set in motion slowly evolving juridical and political rationalizations which periodically
proved crucial in deciding the direction of many great groupmovements throughout history. The notion of such a law has
dominated the zone of jurisprudence. It has been badly
mutilated by certain quasi-thinkers, but those who have endeavored to banish the concept completely have failed. In
the words of Prof. Benjamin Wright: I
"Unless we are willing to contend that the concept of a law that
ought to be is an inadmissible one, the basis of natural law, remains
untouched."
It is true that in the United States a maximum heterogeneity I has been communicated to the classification "natural
law." Only its normative implication has been universally
retained. Whether the gauge be the "natural law" of standards and received ideals, advocated by Professor Pound 4 and
the sociological school of jurisprudence, as the ideal picture
of the end of law, or whether it be the normative element in
the juridical faiths of the late Mr. Justice Cardozo,5 Dean
Landis,6 Professor Simpson I or Professor Llewellyn, 8 or the
lex naturalisof Professor Adler I and the scholastic jurists, or
the "natural law" of behaviorism or psychological yearning
2 WRIGHT, A-IcAN INTERPRETATIONS or NATURAL LAW (1931) 323.
Note
his reference to Morris Cohen's article on Jus naturale redivivum, 25 PHnOSoPfiCAL REv. 761 (1916).
8 Ibid. 333-338. There Wright has given a detailed description of eight different meanings which natural law has had in American jurisprudence and politics.
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POUND, LAW AND MORALS (1926) 113 ff.
See CAaDozo, THE NATURE or THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1925)

162 ff.
Landis, The Implications of Modern Legislation to Law Teaching, 7 Am. L.
157 (1935).
Simpson, The Function of the University Lat, School, 49 HARV. L. REV.
(1936).
Llewellyn, Some Realism about Realism, 44 HAEv. L. REv. 1222 (1931).
MICHAEL AND ADLER, CRimm, LAW AND SOCIAL ScIENcE (1933).
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of Jerome Frank 1o and Thurman Arnold," there is an evident unanimous agreement upon the requirement of an extralegal criterion-the constitutive of an apparatus allowing a
process of intelligent change in the juristic regime.
Though the notion of natural law has been variously anathematized, it has served a very useful purpose in the history
of American law. Regardless of the many disadvantageous
consequences which have resulted from deficient or erroneous
interpretations of the natural law in the United States, it has
been particularly helpful in the creation and improvement of
both public and private law. This was inevitable. Roscoe
Pound has stated, that in every period of the growth of law,
"it has been liberalized by ideas of natural right or justice
or reasonableness or utility, leading to criteria by which rules
and principles and standards might be tested." 12 Although
a doctrine of natural law was not much needed in American
political theory after the Civil War,' 3 it was highly important
thereafter in the building up of American Constitutional
law. 4 The importance of natural law in this respect is thus
described by Professor Haines:
"The process by which certain ideas involved in the law of nature
were judicially declared within the language of the fundamental law
constitutes an important step in the evolution of the legal concept in
the United States. It is this principle which renders natural law such
an important principle in modern constitutional law." ':

Ethical principles under the name of natural law received
constitutional sanction in the due process clause,16 the fifth '"
and fourteenth 18 amendments, and the requirement of equal
to FRAEx, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930).
THE SyMBoLs OF GOVERNMENT (1935); TnE FOLKLORE OF CAP11 ARNOr,
rrALIsm (1937).
12 POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW (1921) 84.
13 WRIGHT, op. cit. supra note 2 at 327 ff.
14 Ibid, 330 ff.

15 Haines, The Law of Nature in State and Federal Judicial Decisions, 25
Yale L. Jour. 636 (1916).
16 HAINES, THE REVIVAL or NATURAL LAW CoCEPmS (1930) 347 ff.
17 See Twining v. N. J., 211 U. S. 78 (1908).
18 See Howard v. Kentucky, 200 U. S. 164, 173 (1906); Holden v. Hardy.
169 U. S. 366, 389 (1897) ; Hurtado v. California, 110. U. S. 516. 536 (1883).
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protection of the laws." This happened although judges
were often inclined to use a synonym for natural law such as
"reason" or the "nature of the thing" and the like. Instances
of this are to be found in the decisions of Marshall, 0

Chase,2 ' Kent

2'

and others.

In the field of private law, the concept of natural law made
possible the growth of equity jurisdiction and the gradual
amelioration of the common law, both substantively and adjectively. 21 It justified the fiction of the "reasonable man"
which played such a large part in the law of torts. It was
the groundwork of the law of quasi-contract, conflict of laws,
trusts, wills, mortgages and the like, however camouflaged
the natural law factor might have been in specific adjudications.24
But in spite of the vast benefits which the philosophy of
natural law has conferred upon the American legal system,
it was employed paradoxically at times as an instrument of
economic oppression and social injustice. This result has
flowed from misconceptions of the structure and function of
natural law as understood by those who centuries before had
conceived the category. Four erroneous deviations from this
original notion of natural law may be observed in the history
of American law.
In the first place, certain judges and legislators in the
formative period of American law at times identified natural
law with positive law, i. e., the moral order with the legal.
Bills of Rights and constitutional amendments were treated
simply as declarations of natural liberty which was identical
19

See Giozza v. Tiernan, 148 U. S. 657, 662 (1892).

See Marshall's views in Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87, 135 (1810). There
he stated that it might well be doubted whether the nature of society and of
government does not prescribe some limit to the legislative power.
21 Thus note Chase's opinion in Calder v. Bull, 3 Dallas 386, 388 (1798) that
a positive law made by the legislature in contravention of the first principles of
the social compact would not be rightful.
22 See Dash v. Kleeck, 7 Johns. (N. Y.) 477, 505 (1811).
23 Haines, op. cit. supra note 15 at 651.
24
Ibid, 617.
20
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with common law liberty. Constitutions declared common
law principles which were at the same time natural law generalizations. This fallacy had been fostered by Coke and
was so deeply imbedded in American politics and jurisprudence that when the American colonists decided in 1776 to
throw off the political yoke of England, they approved a
Declaration of Independence which asserted a congeries of
inalienable natural rights which were equivalent to their
common law rights which they had set forth in the Continental Congress two years earlier.
What was the result of this confusion of law and morals?
The law-makers often idealized the established legal precepts
which were regarded as fundamental, immutable and eternal.
These rules were not capable of progression toward an extrinsic ethical goal. Many legislators tended to believe that
the legislative process was primarly a matter of sustaining a
specific legal order rather than of endeavoring to make that
order conform, as far as practically possible, to an outside
moral ideal. In some nineteenth century decisions, it was
held that the judicial process must prevent the alteration of
the common law categories of contractual ability by legislation. 2" The theory was that since the common law was the
same as natural law and since this latter existed prior to the
State and hence was superior to the will of the State, the
legislature must not fundamentally change the Common
law.216
But obviously the concept of a positive law which was
identical with natural law was incompatible with the homogeneity of the Thomistic-Aristotelian category. The ultimate notion of jus naturalewas the denial of an ideal system
of human positive law, springing from reason and existing
eternal, immutable, and equally applicable to all times and
places. The raison d'etre of Greek natural law thinking was
25

See State v. Fire Creek Coal and Coke Co., 33 W. Va. 188 (1889).

26 See Comm. v. Perry, 155 Mass. 117 (1891); Leep v. Ry. Co., 58 Ark. 407

(1894); State v. Loomis. 115 Mo. 307 (1893).
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the subjection of the legal order. But this necessarily implied
the existence of these two orders as distinct entities.
Secondly, the natural law was sometimes viewed as a
specification of moral rights, which supported legal rights
without any corresponding legal duties. Since the natural
law, under this interpretation, did not prescribe duties, these
moral rights were absolute."
The same was true of legal
rights. The sole purpose of the positive law, therefore, was
to protect and maintain the rights of individuals against
other individuals and the state. This juristic theory of rights,
whether regarded as moral qualities, inherent in human beings and deducible from the abstract, isolated, individual
man, after the doctrine of Grotius, or based upon a social contract, such as that postulated by Rousseau, was individualistic. Whether the basis of these moral qualities was voluntaristic, or non-voluntaristic, they must be given effect by the
common law regardless of social consequences. One school
of American natural law jurists followed the Coke dogma
vhich identified natural law with the common law, and the
other, the doctrine of the French-Dutch publicists, but each
was concerned with rights rather than duties.
As a consequence of this second false interpretation of
natural law, judges began to speak of the absolute rights of
property, freedom of contract, "s exemption from taxation,
and the like. Natural law thus became a weapon against
social progress and legal reform. Beneficial labor legislation
was invalidated in the name of natural law. Social facts
were ignored in the judicial process. Is it surprising that
this "led a number of writers who are primarily interested in
social reform and in constitutional law to adopt (an) . . .
unfriendly attitude toward natural law" 21 in general?
27

Brown, The Bar and the Democratic Process, 13

TEMPLE

L. QUART. 287-205

(1939).
28 See Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L. JOUR. 454 (1909); Adair v.
U. S. 208 U. S. 161, 175 (1907); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U. S. 1 (1914).
29 WRGHT, oP. cit. Supra note 2 at 316.
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But here again, there was a radical deviation from the
content of the jus naturalewhich was evidently not only for
the benefit of the individual but also of society, because its
original Greek rationale perceived a law which was essentially for the purpose of holding together and aiding cosmos.
This in turn was.beneficial to the individual units which went
into the construction of cosmos. But the secret of the law
which made possible cosmos was referable to an equilibrium
between the whole and its parts and between the constitutive
parts. By analogy, in the field of human society (the human
cosmos), such a theory must demand a balancing of rights
and duties, the conceptual and the actual, unity and plurality, and stability and motion.
Thirdly, some American jurists and judges were of the
opinion that the basis of natural law was subjective rather
than objective. From this point of view, natural law was what
the individual judge thought it was. It was the reflection of
his own personal wishes, sense of justice or intuitive feeling.
It was determinable by introspection alone. There was no
authority in the form of history, custom, sociology, economics, or, the rational sciences to which this intuitive determination of the content of the natural law was subject.
This theory of natural law which refused to recognize any
authoritative objective basis could be and frequently was a
tool of social injustice. It might be arbitrarily employed by
a judge either to uphold a specific precept of law or to overrule it. It afforded judges an opportunity of injecting their
own personal sociological and economic predilections into
the judicial function. It enabled them to exploit the law for
the protection of class interests. It gave the critics of natural law jurisprudence occasion to ,say that such law was but
an empty symbol, a trap for the unwary and a subterfuge for
unscrupulous manipulators of the law.
How did such a notion of natural law compare with the
classical model of the jus naturale? The Greek metaphysical
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substructure of the jus naturale was referable to the obser-

vational data of matter, mechanics, and motion fixed in a set
pattern. There was general agreement as to the fundamental contour of this objective physical mold. Denial of
this pattern did not affect the fact of its existence. The
moral order analogously existed as a metaphysical fact despite denial by human intelligences. Besides existence, therefore, this order had definite and specific form, independently
of the will of any human individual. Its shape was not ascertainable by abstract reasoning. The rational process must
be proceeded by an inquiry into the fact-content of senseperceptions.
According to classical conceptions, no judge could ignore
extrinsic subsidia in his endeavor to know the meaning of
natural law or to apply it in concrete adjudications. Judges
might vary to some extent in their conception of this norm,
just as physical scientists differed as to the measurements of
matter, but the justice of juridical decisions depended upon
adherence to this outer authority, however much the individual judge sought to interpose his own mind. Of course a
judge would not be morally culpable, if he in good faith followed a misinformed conscience.
Fourthly, there were American jurists who did not derive
from their natural law jurisprudence a comprehension of the
teleological character of law. Means and end were telescoped by those who merged the legal and moral orders. Positive law had no function to perform except to maintain itself. Justice was to be measured in terms of the maintenance
of the existing legal regime rather than by its conformity to
an ideal moral order. Some courts reasoned in vacuo.
Judicial premises were sometimes a little more than meaningless cliches which led to conclusions out of joint with life
and experience.
But the regrettable evils which followed in the wake of this
deficient legal doctrine are well known since their exposure
by the sociological and realist schools of jurisprudence. The
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jurisprudence of conceptions which had sometimes been given
moral aid by the sanction of quasi-natural law was a logical
outgrowth of a static positive law. A law which ceased to
grow could not be used as a means to achieve contemporary
social objectives.
A reasonable interpretation of the implicit tenets of the
original conception of natural law would have revealed the
essential factor of purposefulness. 'The rediscovery of the
teleological aspect of law by Ehrlich and Jhering, culminating in the modern "engineering" or "architectural" notions
of jurisprudence, has been followed by the restoration of an
important element to the body of jurisprudence. This element had been removed through the quackery of pseudonatural law jurists and representatives of the historical and
analytical schools. The renaissance of juridical dynamism
is tantamount to a reaffirmation of the wisdom of the jus
naturale. Could the idea of law as a means to an end be
more clearly revealed than by the thought that law was for
the purpose of ordering the cosmos of society and that law
was to actualize the divine plan for men living in society?
Truly it would be a fascinating study to endeavor to ascertain why so many nineteenth century and early twentieth
century legalists insisted upon interpretations of natural law
which, it is now generally conceded, retarded much desirable
social legislation, why they assisted in transmitting erroneous
notions which brought all natural law thinking into disrepute, and why they thus delayed the entrance of the American State into its proper sphere as a reconstructor of the
social order for the improvement of the general temporal
welfare. Were they ignorant of the history of the philosophy
of natural law? Or did a mistaken idealism make them disdainful of the partially pragmatic character of the earliest
form of natural law, which reckoned with facts as well as
principles, results as well as causes, and the centripetal and
centrifugal social forces which unite in the equilibrium of
basic group units?
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But despite all the deleterious influences which the philosophy of natural law has exerted in the areas of American
law and politics, can it be said to have been of less value, in
the light of the many good results which have accrued from
the impingement of this particular form of philosophical jurisprudence upon American civilization, than other eighteenth
and nineteenth century theories? Surely natural law jurisprudence did serve as a principle of legal growth and improvement by and large in the United States. It was characterized neither by the sterility of the analytical methodology, nor the antiquarianism of the historical.
From this survey of the part played lby the natural law
concept in American jurisprudence, it is manifest that all the
attacks which have been levelled against this juridical conviction ignored the Aristotelian-Thomistic type and were
concentrated on counterfeit brands of natural law. This
should afford a clue as to the best future direction of natural
law thinking. Obviously the category of natural law should
be stripped of its erroneous content, a new name employed
if possible to describe it, and an exhaustive effort made to explore the maximum potentialities of natural law as a medium
of political and juridical reform and advancement.
Legists should explain more adequately the meaning of
natural law and its multitudinous functions. Perhaps this
will necessitate the growth of a large group of jurists in this
country who are sympathetic toward the restoration of the
philosophy of natural law to its rightful place in the world of
jurisprudence. But whatever the cost in terms of effort, contemporary civilization will be amply repaid. Indeed if natural law thinking continues in-its present muddled state, so
that it will play no decisive role in determining the future
direction of the world hegemony of ideas, man will have betrayed his faculties.
Apparently the task of rescuing the legal philosophy of
natural law from its present deplorable state will be accom-
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plished, if ever, only by the work of scholastic legists. Fortunately there has been a rather recent revival of scholastic
or theophilosophical jurisprudence in both Europe and the
United States. This has perhaps been most pronounced in
France. There the work of Francois Geny, Professor in the
Catholic University of Nancy, has been outstanding. His
greatest work, Science et technique en droit priv6 positi,80
sensing as it does the significance of the transitions through
which the notion of natural law has passed in reference to the
domain of positive law, and perceiving that emphasis must
now be placed upon "social life as a moral phenomenon," "
as well as upon the individual as a moral entity who ought to
obey the natural law as stressed by Thomas Aquinas, has
actually demarcated the sphere which should be investigated
by modern proponents of neo-scholastic jurisprudence. The
amplification of content produced by applying reasonably implicit tenets of Greek-inspired Thomism to the new facts
created by changes in social structure since the days of
ancient Greek and the medievalism of the thirteenth century
is revealed in the work of Geny. Insofar as Geny has marked
out "a neo-scholastic theory subjecting social life, that is,
the life of the individual man as a moral entity in society as
a moral phenomenon, to the scrutiny of reason in order to
discover certain precepts which may be used to establish
norms (i. e., patterns or models) for law-making, law-finding,
and the application of law," 32 he has furnished jurists who
are concerned with the institutions and legal figures of the
Anglo-American legal system with a great quarry of materials from which much inspiration may be drawn. An inkling
of Geny's concept of natural law may be had from the statement that "if natural law is called upon to circumscribe the
activities of man, it must never forget that man presents himSo In four volumes, I (1913), II (1915), III (1921), IV (1924).
31 Pound, Fifty Years of Jurisprudence, 51 Huv.L. REv. 464 (1938).
82 GENY, 2 SCIENCE ET TECHNIQUE EN DROIT PR-iv PosrTiz

(1915) 9-11.
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self less as an individual than as a member of society, which
puts him in continuous contact and relation with his fellows." 33

Likewise in the United States, there has been a revival of
theophilosophical jurisprudence, although as yet an American Geny has not emerged. This has taken the shape of
important written contributions, speaking the language
which has been endorsed by contemporary American jurisprudence, yet restating the ancient truths in terms of their
impact upon modern law. Outstanding in these productions
are the writings of Robert Maynard Hutchins "' and Professor Mortimer Adler " of the University of Chicago, who
have shown the deficiencies in types of American legal education, futilely presuming that inert facts will arrange themselves; of Professor Walter Kennedy of Fordham University
who has bombed the citadel of juridical pseudo-realism 6
from the stratosphere of scholastic natural law; and of Dean
James Thomas Connor 1- of Loyola University in New Orleans who is beginning to test the soundness of certain American legal institutions from the viewpoint of scholastic doctrine. In 1936, the American Catholic Philosophical Association was persuaded to inaugurate an annual round table
on the philosophy of law, which has borne fruit in the production of six papers " to date on various phases of scholastic
jurisprudence. Dr. Miriam Theresa Rooney, a leader in
33

Ibid 18.
See Hutchins, Legal Education, 4 U. Cm. L. REv. 357 (1937).
See Adler, Legal Certainty, 31 CoL. L. Rav. 91 (1931).
386 For example in such articles as Principles or Facts, 4 FoRnEAm L. Rav. 53
(1935).
37 Thus see Connor, The Law of Succession, 8 FoDHAm L. Ray. 151-165
(1939).
38 Lilly and. Curran, The Possibilities of a Neo-Scholastic Philosophy of
Law in the United States, 12 PROCEamIGS or THE A mcAN CATHOLIC PEILCIlSOPHiCAL Assoc:TATioN 111-117 (1936); Kennedy and Russell, Current Attacks
Upon and Suggested Methods of Preserving a Neo-Scholastic Jurisprudence, 13
IBID. 186-201 (1937); Farrell and Connor, The Derivation of Political Authority,
The American Catholic Philosophical Association has
14 IBM. 103-121 (1938).
begun its series of philosophical studies with the publication of Rev. Dr. William
F. Obering's S.J., study in comparative jurisprudence entitled THE PH-LosoPHY
oF LAW or JAmms WILSoN, 1789-1798.
34
35

NATURAL LAW'S FUNCTION IN AMERICA

that organization, has demonstrated the philosophical limitations of material pragmatism in contemporary jurisprudence. " ' Prior to the renaissance of this jurisprudence
in the United States such pioneers as Father Holaind 3" of
Georgetown University and Dean Robinson .' of the Catholic
University of America at the turn of the last century and
Father LeBuffe " of Fordham in more recent times had
transmitted the essential ideals to which scholastic jurisprudence should aspire. So great was this renaissance that
the new Aristotelian scholasticism has been ranked in authoritative circles 42 as one of the three most dominant schools
of jurisprudence in the United States.
But this revival of natural law jurisprudence in the theophilosophical sense will be short lived unless it is reinforced
by the active support of the faculties of Church law schools.4"
The undertaking of making understandable the full meaning
of the category of scholastic natural law in the every day
workshop of the Common lawyer and judge is no easy matter, particularly because there is no important experience
upon which to proceed. Because of historical accident,
scholastic philosophy had no opportunity to walk hand in
hand with the Common law " as it had relative to the Roman
and Canon laws in the great medieval universities after the
revival of learning at Bologna in the twelfth century. A
comparable educational process will be possible only if legal
381 See Rooney, Pluralism and the Law, 13 THE Nzw ScHoLASTIcIsu 301-335
(1930); Rooney, LAWLESSNESS, LAw, AND SANCTION (1937).
39
40
41

HOLAIND, NATURAL LAW AND LEGAL PRACTICE (1899) 51.
ROBINSON, ELEmENTS OF AmERicAN JURISPRUDENCE (1900).
LEBurE, OUTLINES OF PURE JURISPRUDENCE (1924); LEBumFE AND HAYES,

JURISPRUDENCE (1938).
42 For example in the 1937-1938 Jurisprudence Seminar in the Harvard Law
School. See Pound, Fifty Years of Jurisprudence,So HAv. L. REv. 464 ff (1938).
43 Brown, JurisprudentialAims of Church Law Schools in the United StatesA Survey, 13 NOTRE DAtE LAWY. 163 (1938).
44 Brown, Catholic Education and Law, in VITAL PROBLEMS OF CATHOLIC
EDuCAoN IN THE UNITED STATES (1939-Ed. by Deferrari) 218-231, the lecture
was delivered August 6, 1939, before the Summer School of the Catholic University
of America, as part of the Golden Jubilee program of the University.
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educators endeavor to gain a better knowledge of natural law
and make it the starting point in their every day pedagogy.
In the clarification of the scholastic meaning of natural
law, its plastic applicability must be emphasized. Adherents
of the scholastic school of jurisprudence may disagree among
themselves as to the wisdom of a specific adjudication or a
particular legislative enactment, although they are agreed as
to the moral generalization which is the starting point. They
may agree as to the ultimate ethical postulate, but disagree
as to sub-ultimates. They may be of different opinions as to
the existence of certain facts or as to their relative weights.
In such instances their juridical conclusions would be different. The content of the aggregate of the legal rules produced
casuistically in the judicial, administrative, and legislative
processes, respectively, by applying the jus naturale to facts,
legal or extra-legal, must necessarily vary as often as these
facts undergo substantial change.
But at the same time, future studies as to the significance
of scholastic natural law, as applied to positive law, should
bring out with equal clarity the existence of the static opposite in the form of fixed ultimates, contrasted with the dynamic terminal. The ethical sub-ultimates of the sociological
and realist schools of jurisprudence, which are apparently
moving toward nowhere and causing the proponents of these
schools to fall into the error of confusing means with end,
against which they have so successfully contended in reference to competing brands of jural thinking, can be given ultimate direction and their teleological value determined in
specific instances. Twentieth century "scholastic realism"
may integrate the prevalent juridical techniques by supplying an adequately comprehensive teleological idealism. Just
as positive law should be a means to a moral end, so also
should a sub-ultimate ideal be a means to a final ethical end.
There is need of haste in making available a well-worked
out exposition of the classical conception of natural law for

NATURAL

LAW'S FUNCTION IN AMERICA

law-makers, enabling them to invoke an authority strong
enough to preserve the best in the American legal tradition
and to discard the worst. The sweeping condemnation of the
natural law basis of most of our public law, with the innuendo
that every type of law jurisprudence is passe, must ultimately
lead to the repudiation of our traditional political order itself, because it was the natural law concept which molded
and gave contour to the American State. If -the authority of
every form of natural law jurisprudence can be overthrown,
first in law, and thereafter in the political field, it is very easy
to understand how easily a bloodless revolution could take
place with respect to the American State, which might be
made in the future to rely on the physical sanction of force,
or the will .ofmajorities:
But since every form of natural law jurisprudence except
that of the jus naturaleis highly vulnerable to intellectual onslaught because of fundamental weaknesses, the only hope-of
continuing the American natural law tradition, over and
above its present widespread and inescapable usage as a normative critique for the positive law, is by recourse to the
plastic scholastic model. Not only will this pattern afford
law-makers ideals, but it will provide an authority which will
endow our basic social institutions with relative stability.
The retention of the category of jus naturale in the judicial
process will have the psychological value of insuring continuity in our traditional jurisprudence which by way of parallelism will aid the continuity of our political and social orders. This continuity should tend to insure their substantial
continuance in the future.
The chaotic- stage through which the whole world seems to
be passing at the present time, largely as a result of rejecting
natural law philosophy in international relations, the complete breakdown of the natural law mode of thought as the
basis of international law, the rejection of the natural law
category, either in theory or in fact or in both in the totalitar-
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ian countries,-in short the elimination of natural law philosophy from both the international and national orders, with
results which are obviously disastrous to the happiness of
man and frustrative of his final spiritual end, must be apparent to all American jurists. The lesson learned from this
should be utilized now-the lesson that the annihilation of
the jus naturale, the denial of a divine plan, the rejection of
the example of a cosmos unified by supra-human law, the
isolation of human society from the context of the universe,
and the attribution of divine finality to human law and divine perfection to human will, must place men on a purely
animal or physical plane, wherein the savagery of the jungle
will be imitated with consummate astuteness.
In the light of reason and experience, the best assurance
of the continuation of the sociological factor in law which
has been the object of greatest attention on the part of jurists who have been the severest critics of natural law jurisprudence is the survival of the doctrine of the jus naturale.
If sociological jurisprudence is grounded merely upon an
emotional humanitarianism, the arising of class conflicts in
the domestic arena and of national and racial encounters in
the amphitheater of war would tend to paralyze its inner
energizing nucleus, because the animalistic aspects of mankind would be starkly revealed. But if the duty of legists to
improve law as an instrument of human happiness is
grounded upon a supra-human mandate, then the obligation
remains whatever man may do to prove himself unworthy of
juridical consideration.
In conclusion, therefore, the concept of natural law is
more essential for the proper operation of the judicial and
law-making processes than ever before. Many legislators
and judges have become convinced that all natural law jurisprudence is an obstacle to legal improvement and right political growth because in the past theories of natural law were
used to oppose social and economic betterment. Positive and
natural law were made identical, judges talked of absolute
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legal rights, they resorted to their own economic convictions
under the guise of natural law in the decision of cases. The
idea that law was to be purposive was rejected. Now it must
be demonstrated that all these evils were the result of natural
law theories which were not consonant with the classical doctrine of the jus naturale. The great value of natural law
jurisprudence when used in its genuine sense in the origin
and evolution of the American legal and political systems
must be reiterated.
The logical custodians of a scholasticized category of natural law and of its accompanying jurisprudence are the faculties of Church law schools. They are chiefly responsible
for the future of such jurisprudence which has enjoyed a considerable revival in recent years. Devotion to this cause will
not only serve the ends of truth, but will contribute to the
wide-spread socialization of the law by supplying a definitive
authority-the absence of which is perhaps the greatest
weakness in the sociological and realist movements. A
strong scholastic cult of law will be a source of strength to all
those who are convinced of the wisdom of perpetuating the
reign of natural law, both at home and abroad, and perceive,
in the growing anarchy of the world order, the triumph of a
socio-economic ethical philosophy gaining ascendency to the
extent that men withdraw their allegiance from the Author
of the jus naturale.
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